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of the trial court for newly discovered evidence (obtaining a stay of
execution from the governor in the meantime if necessary) .20 But here
again the burden would be on the defendant to show that he was prej-
udiced by not having been able to produce this newly discovered evidence
at the original trial.
Therefore, it would seem that, though North Carolina recognizes
the existence of this fundamental right which is guaranteed one accused
of a crime, the essence of the right is denied him unless he can prove
that he will be aided by the exercise thereof. Further it would appear
that this requirement placed upon the defendant is opposed to another
of our fundamental doctrines, that a person is presumed innocent until
proved guilty (the burden being on the state to prove him guilty). Pos-
sibly, under the North Carolina rule, a person could be proved guilty
because of a denial of adequate time for preparation and being thus
convicted, the burden would be shifted to him to introduce evidence
which would bear on his innocence at a new trial, i.e., show that the
denial of the motion was prejudicial.
The North Carolina rule is plainly an attempt to keep the wheels
of justice moving rapidly by avoiding useless new trials where the only
end to be accomplished is a delay in the conviction of the accused. The
Supreme Court, by taking the burden upon itself, endeavors to separate
the wheat from the chaff by deciding each case from its circumstances.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court of the United States
would sustain this North Carolina view as being a sufficient guarantee
of this fundamental right to the accused.
21
A. A. ZOLLICOFFER, JR.
Equity-Easement-Mandatory Injunction to Remove
Encroachment
Plaintiff power company acquired an easement over the defendants'
land by condemnation proceedings for the construction, inspection and
repair of its power lines. The defendants built a brick building across
the right-of-way and ten feet below the high-voltage lines. Held:-
three judges dissenting-the plaintiff was entitled to mandatory injunc-
22 State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948) ; State v. Dunheen,
224 N. C. 738, 32 S. E. 2d 322 (1944); State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172
S. E. 399 (1933) ; State v. Casey, 201 N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 (1931).
21 Certiorari was denied by the United State Supreme Court in State v. Whit-
field, 206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556 (1934).
There the defendant was indicted and convicted of rape. Counsel had two days
in which to prepare, his motion for a continuance having been overruled. The
facts were simple and there were only two witnesses, the defendant and the prosecu-
trix. Thus the case was reduced to a question of veracity between the two and
there was no plea of insanity.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion to compel the defendants to remove their building from the plain-
tiff's easement.'
It is well settled that where a right-of-way is substantially obstructed
the person offended may get a mandatory injunction to compel the re-
moval of the obstruction.2  If the interference with the easement is in
violation of an interlocutory decree, mandatory injunction may be granted
before final hearing to compel the restoration of the easement to its
former condition.3 Since easements are incorporeal interests in the land
'Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman et al., 229 N. C. 682, 51 S. E. 2d
191 (1949).
2 Stallard v. Cushing, 76 Cal. 472, 18 Pac. 427 (1888) (stairway placed in
alley through which plaintiff had right-of-way) ; Trueblood v. Pierce, 116 Colo.
221, 179 Pac. 2d. 671 (1947) (curb built in plaintiff's driveway); Carpenter v.
Capital Electric Co., 178 Ill. 29, 52 N. E. 973 (1899) (cross-arm and two wires
placed over plaintiff's at height of 14 feet) ; Lake Erie & W. R. v. Essington, 27
Ind. App. 291, 60 N. E. 457 (1901) (plaintiff's driveway obstructed-the sort of
obstruction does not appear); Aboud v. Bailen, 289 Ky. 536, 159 S. W. 2d 410
(1942) (heavy barrels, iron box and pipe placed on plaintiff's passway) ; Schaidt
v. Blaul, 66 Md. 141, 6 Atl. 669 (1886) (stone wall across plaintiff's right-of-
way) ; St. Louis Deposit & Savings Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 370,
74 S. W. 474 (1903) (alley between plaintiff's and defendant's buildings obstructed
by projecting smokestack); Bailey v. Schnitzius, 53 N. J. Eq. 235, 32 Atl. 219
(1895) (right-of-way obstructed by overflowing it with water); Carolina and
Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51 S. E.
2d 301 (1949) (fence and other obstructions upon plaintiff's right-of-way);
Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d 889 (1943) (two brick walls,
fence, shrubbery and badminton court across alley-way) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202
N. C. 130, 162 S. E. 372 (1932) (defendant "closed" abandoned public highway) ;
Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N. C. 511,
112 S. E. 24 (1922) (seven-foot embankment placed across driveway); Wheeler
v. Charlotte Construction Co., 170 N. C. 427, 87 S. E. 221 (1915) (stables and
other obstructions placed upon street right-of-way); Moundsville Water Co. v.
Moundsville Sand-Co., 124 W. Va. 118, 19 S. E. 2d 217 (1942) (sand and gravel
placed on plaintiff's easement which plaintiff used for maintainence of its pipe-
lines).
The following cases are based on facts similar to those of the principal case:
Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926) (five-room
house built fifteen feet over on right-of-way which plaintiff had acquired for the
maintenance of its power lines); Willingham v. Georgia Power Co., 193 Ga.
801, 20 S. E. 2d 83 (1942) (lumber stacked on land over which plaintiff had
easement to construct and maintain its power lines) ; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d 864 (Court of Appeal of La., 1947) (frame house built over
plaintiff's high pressure gas line) ; cf. Babler v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 34 F. Supp.
10 (E. D. Mo. 1940) (plaintiff was held to have right to maintain building over
defendant's pipe lines).
'Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. v. Webster Sand, Gravel & Construction Co., 132 La.
1051, 62 So. 140 (1913) (defendant ordered to replace plaintiff's rails and cross-
ties); Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N. C.
511, 112 S. E. 24 (1922) (defendants ordered to remove embankment placed
across driveway). In Keys v. Alligood, 178 N. C. 16, 100 S. E. 113 (1919)
where the defendant was ordered to replace ditch banks of a road over which the
plaintiff had a right-of-way, the North Carolina Court expressly said that the
injunction was mandatory and repudiated the old form of stating a mandatory
order in prohibitory terms. For a decision allowing, in effect, a mandatory in-
junction but which, in so doing, followed the old form of words, see Westbrook
v. Comer, 197 Ga. 433, 29 S. E. 2d 574 (1944) (fence and shrubbery placed in
alley over which plaintiff had easement).
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of another4 giving the grantee limited rights of user in the land for
certain purposes (or, in the case of negative easements, rights that the
owner of the fee refrain from using his own land in certain ways) a
particular use or obstruction by the grantor is not enjoinable unless it
seriously interferes with the easement.5 If the obstruction is not sub-
stantial in character it may be that the owner of the easement has an
adequate remedy by way of self-help or damages. 6
When mandatory injunction is sought to compel the removal of a
trespassing encroachment from land it may be refused if other remedies
are found to be as adequate as injunction.7  Having successfully passed
the adequacy tests injunctive relief may still be denied if the balance of
hardships 9 inclines in favor of the defendant. Such a suit puts a court
in this dilemma: If it refuses to grant the injunction and awards dam-
ages for the strip involved because the balance of hardships is in favor
of the defendant, it may be accused of exercising private eminent do-
main.10 On the other hand, to grant injunction where the order for
' Korricks Dry Goods Co. v. Kendall, 83 Ariz. 325, 264 Pac. 692 (1928);
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N. E. 645 (1921); St.
Cecelia Soc. v. Universal Car and Service Co., 213 Mich. 569, 182 N. W. 161
(1921); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925); GALE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 9 (Tenth Ed., W. J. Byrne, 1925).
6 Bitello v. Lipson, 80 Conn. 597, 69 Atl. 21 (1908); Farmers' Grain & Sup-
ply Co. of Warsaw v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 316 Ill. App. 116, 44 N. E. 2d 77
(1942) ; Cleveland, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,
380 Il. 130, 43 N. E. 2d 993 (1942); Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 219 N. C. 402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1941) (by implication); Raleigh
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Vass, 184 N. C. 295, 114 S. E. 309 (1922); Fendall
v. Miller, 99 Ore. 610, 196 Pac. 381 (1921) ; Taylor v. Heffner, 359 Pa. 157, 58
A. 2d 450 (1948).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS §950 (1939).
'Howell v. Township of Sewickley, 352 Pa. 552, 43 A. 2d 121 (1945) ; Smith
v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 5 S. E. 2d 492 (1939).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS §933 (1939) Special Note. "The availability of in-
junction against tort has usually been stated in terms of the inadequacy of the
remedy at law, inadequacy of damages, and irreparable injury. . . . Moreover,
the elliptical, shorthand expressions quoted are misleading. They imply that in-
junction will be refused unless other remedies are inadequate in the sense of being
wholly unservicable or worthless, . . . As applied by the courts, however, the
adequacy test has a relative meaning; it is founded upon the adequacy of injunc-
tion as the standard of comparison. When the courts have analyzed these adequacy
formulae, they have always concluded that other remedies are to be deemed
adequate if they are as efficient to the ends of justice as the injunction; otherwise,
they are to be deemed inadequate."
'Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So. 2d 345 (1946); Coombs v. Lenox
Realty Co., 111 Me. 178, 88 Atl. 477 (1913); Triulzi v. Costa, 296 Mass. 24, 4
N. E. 2d 617 (1936) ; Methodist Episcopal Soc. v. Akers, 167 Mass. 560, 46 N. E.
381 (1897) ; Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 159 Mass. 306, 34 N. E. 364
(1893); Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N. H. 572, 15 At]. 17 (1888); Crocker v. Man-
hattan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div. 226, 70 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1901).
"0 Bemmerly v. Lake County, 55 Cal. App. 2d 829, 132 P. 2d 249 (1942) (in-
junction granted because the court feared that to deny injunction upon balancing
the hardships would be private eminent domain) ; Lynch v. Union Institution of
Savings, 158 Mass. 384, 33 N. E. 603 (1893); Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber
Co., 127 W. Va. 586, 34 S. E. 2d 348 (1945) (injunction granted, the court ex-
pressing fear that to balance the hardships and award damages in lieu would
[Vol. 27
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removal places a relatively large hardship upon the defendant and the
plaintiff has suffered only slight harm may make the cout a party to
extortion.11
The problem is not present, however, where an easement is substan-
tially obstructed as in the principal case. 2 It is one thing to place a
building a few inches over upon a person's land and quite another to
erect a building across his easement and just below high voltage wires.
In the former case the victim may be deprived of only a small strip of
land; in the latter he may be compelled to yield his entire interest (i.e.,
his right of user) since the presence of the building may make the
exercise of the easement dangerous or impossible.
The court does not, in the principal case, attempt to balance the
hardships. It is submitted that it properly refrains from so doing. The
plaintiff is seriously affected by the presence of the defendants' building
upon its easement. Projected, improvements would be interfered with
and repairs would be made difficult, with possible consequent decline in
the standard of service to the public. Should lightning strike or the
plaintiff's wires touch the building 3 the plaintiff might be subjected to
actions for personal injuries and wrongful death. These factors, coupled
with the expense and difficulty of acquiring new easements and adjust-
ing equipment to them, make it apparent that the plaintiff will insist
upon the enforcement of the injunctive decree. The danger of the
injunction's being used as a tool of extortion reaches the vanishing
point here. To deny injunction and to award damages for an easement
upon the easement would be an intolerable adjustment. The public in-
terest 14 in the prevention of interference with the service performed
amount to private eminent domain). See Simpson, Fifty Years of Amierican
Equity, 50 HARY. L. REv. 171, 176 (1936) where, in speaking of denying injunction
in nuisance cases upon balancing the hardships, it is said that the use of the
technique "has sometimes verged uncomfortably close to a judicial grant of the
power of eminent domain to private persons for private purposes." For an effective
answer to such accusations, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §941 (1939) comment d,
where it is stated that refusal of injunction because of balancing the hardships
is not private eminent domain, but "the result 'is incidental to a fair adjustment
of a largely unintended situation."
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS §941 (1939) comment c.
2 The plaintiff's right-of-way was 50 feet wide. The defendants' building
covered 35 feet of this width for the entire length of the right-of-way; the roof
was 10 feet below the wires.
"- It appears from the report of the principal case that these dangers were
pointed out by an electrical engineer who testified for the defendants.
1" Public interest was made the basis for refusing mandatory injunction in:
Wilkins v. Diven, 106 Kan. 283, 187 Pac. 665 (1920); Bell v. Louisville Water
Co., 29 Ky. L. 866, 96 S. W. 572 (1906) (encroaching structures part of water
system supplying Louisville, Ky.) ; Andrews v. Cohen, 163 App. Div. 580, 148
N. Y. Supp. 1028 (1914). The following cases granted mandatory injunction
because of public interest: Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Building Corp., 70 F. 2d 377
(C. C. A. 7th 1934), 13 N. C. L. Riy. 233 (1935) (violation of zoning ordinance).
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) the court
19491
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by a power company renders less important the distinction often drawn
in private tort cases between willfulness and negligence on the part of a
defendant 15 and the effect of possible laches or acquiescence on the part
of the plaintiff.' 6
The decision in the principal case is supported by the few decided




Prior to 1942, when the famous McNabb decision' was banded down,
the law as to the admissibility of confessions had been that such an
instrument was admissible if voluntarily made and inadmissible if not.2
said by way of dictum: "If this were a controversy respecting a private way I
would not hesitate to deny the mandatory injunction . . . but it is manifest that,
by reason of the relation which the complainant bears and its duty to the public,
a judgment for damages would be totally inadequate to meet the situation."
" Clough v. Healy & Co., 53 Cal. App. 397, 200 Pac. 378 (1921); Bauby v.
Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927)'; Waterbury Trust Co. v. G. L. D.
Realty Co., 124 Conn. 191, 199 At. 106 (1938); Tucker v. Howard, 128 Mass.
361 (1880) ; Walter v. Danisch, 133 N. J. Eq. 127, 29 A. 2d 897 (1943).
1 In the following cases injunction was refused because of the plaintiff's
laches or acquiesence: Waterbury Trust Co. v. G. L. D. Realty Co,, supra note
15; Perry v. Hewitt, 314 Mass. 346, 50 N. E. 2d 48 (1943) (use of right-of-way
by defendant for about 44 years) ; Levi v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry., 193 Mass.
116, 78 N. E. 853 (1906) (facts not clear but plaintiff appears to have "unreason-
ably" delayed in protecting his rights); Starkie v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188, 29
N. E. 770 (1892) ; Andrews v. Cohen, 163 App. Div. 580, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1028
(1914) (defendant told plaintiff that he intended to build passway over plaintiff's
easement and plaintiff made no objection then or during construction).
17 Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926) (five-room
house built fifteen feet over on right-of-way which plaintiff had acquired for the
maintenance of its power lines, ordered removed) ; Willingham v. Georgia Power
Co., 193 Ga. 801, 20 S. E. 2d 83 (1942) (lumber packed on land over which plain-
tiff had easement to construct and maintain its power lines, ordered removed);
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d 864 (Court of Appeal of La.,
1947) (frame house built over plaintiff's high pressure gas line upon plaintiff's
easement, same result); Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 124
W. Va. 118, 19 S. E. 2d 217 (1942) (sand and gravel placed upon easement
which plaintiff used for maintenance of its water pipe lines, same result) ; Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) (buildings,
fences and other structures were ordered removed from plaintiff railroad's ease-
ment) ; cf. Babler v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 34 F. Supp. 10 (E. D. Mo. 1940)
(not a suit for injunction but plaintiff was held to have the right to maintain a
building over the defendant's pipe lines).
1318 U. S. 332 (1942).
'E.g., Lisenba v. United States, 314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; Wan v. United States,
266 U. S. 1 (1924); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896); Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51 (1895) ; State v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 19,
40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946); State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443 (1856) ; State v. Roberts,
12 N. C. 259 (1827); Rex. v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234
(1783). That this had been the test in England even before 1775 see Rex v. Rudd,
1 Leach 115, 118, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (1775). "The instance has frequently
happened, of persons having made confessions under threats or promises: the con-
sequence as frequently has been that such examinations and confessions have not
been made use of against them on their trial."
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